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After the unanticipated financial crisis of Korea in 1997, lots of debates have been 
held on why and how it came upon. Most of debates including hearings of National 
Assembly focused their attention on why policy makers could not forecast and avoid 
the financial cirsis. No one, if any, asks whether or not there were systems thinking in 
the mind of economic policy makers, what was their theory in action that failed in 
managing the national financial crisis. This paper explores causal maps and systems 
thinking of the President of Korea who successfully managed the financial crisis. In 
this paper the causal map analysis of policy makers is proposed as a promising 
approach for in-depth investigation of systems thinking of policy makers. 
 
1. Are Policy Makers Lack Feedback Thinking? 
 
Working with policy makers in several years, I learned a maxim saying “policy 
makers are not idiots nor genius (NING).” Also I found that policy analysists tend to 
assume them as either idiots or genius. Economists usually suppose a policy maker 
who knows more than any economists ever lived. On the other hand, behavioralists 
usually regard a policy maker as intellectually handicaped person. At both extreme 
poles, one can find simple and nice theories and explanations, which cannot be 
applied well to real persons in real situations. 
 
Lots of studies and experiments found that most decision makers cannot account well 
for feedback processes and thus perform poorly in complex systems of many feedback 
loops (Sterman 1989, Brehmer 1990). As Paich and Sterman point out, poor 
performance in the feedback systems can result from two distinct levels; 
misperception of feedback structure and miscalculation of feedback dynamics (Paich 
& Sterman 1993). The misperception of feedback is regarded as a common feature of 
decision makers. 
 
Although studies on the misperception of feedback produced great implications for 
analysing policies, there are many questions untouched and unanswered. How many 
feedback loops policy makers misperceive? Are they totally ignorant of the feedback 
loops? What kind of feedback loops they tend to ignore? What kind of feedback loops 
tend to be over-emphasized by policy makers? Do correct perception of feedback 
loops guarantee successful performance?  
 
These questions go far beyond the realm of designed experiments. Especially 
experimental designs that focuses on measuring performance level of subjects are 
hard to answer these questions. To answer or touch these questions we need 
qualitative research methods. In this paper a causal map analysis of real policy makers 
is used to find some clues to these questions.  
 
2. Feedback Loops in Previous Studies of Cognitive Maps 
 
The misperception of feedback loop is firstly reported in early days of cognitive map 
studies by Axelrod and his collegues (Axelrod 1976, Bonham, Shapiro, Tremble 
1979). His group constructed three cognitive maps of real policy makers and found 
that there are no feedback loops.  
 
“But the point is that neither positive nor negative feedback loops, and neither 
long nor short loops are present in any of the three spontaneous cognitive maps 
that have been investigated in detail. This is curious. The absence of cycles in 
these maps seems to indicate that the images of the policy environment which 
these decision makers present to each other in their meetings are devoid of 
feedback. It is curious precisely because we know that feedback is vital aspect of 
the dynamics of almost any complex environment, especially social 
environments (p.232, Axelrod 1976)” 
 
Axelrod tries to explain the phenomena of no feedback loops by saying that “Thus the 
explanation seems to be in the way people conceptualize causation: they seem to see it 
as flowing outwards, and not turning back to affect some other concept variable that is 
regarded as causally prior”.  
 
However, Axelrod’s generalization of none-feedback loop phenomena failed when 
subsequent studies on cognitive maps found many feedback loops present in the 
cognitive maps of policy makers. Especially Kissinger’s cognitive map is famous for 
abundance of feedback loops (Maoz 1990). Maoz found not only short cycles but also 
longer cycles in Kissinger’s cognitive map. 
 
“This cycle may be interpreted as follows. The greater the fear from nuclear 
holocaust, the more constructive will US-Siviet relations be. The more 
constructive these relations, the greater the hope for peace. The greater the hopes 
for peace, the less conflicting the ideologies between the superpowers, and hence 
the less the fear from nuclear holocaust. Although such an involved argument 
was never explicitly made by Kissinger in the speech, this causal path is a 
logical derivative of the explicit assertion that Kissinger did make. (pp.132-133, 
Maoz 1990)” 
 
Observing several feedback loops embedded in cognitive maps, researchers in 
cognitive maps have paid little attention on the phenomena of feedback 
misperception. However, this is far from saying that policy makers can account well 
for the feedback structures. Cognitive map analysists regard the feedback loops only 
as an indicating measure of complexity of mental maps (Bougon, Weick, Binkhorst 
1977). Usually cognitive map analyses do not include the investigation of the 
feedback structures. Although cognitive map studies do not provide clear cut 
conclusions on the perception or misperception of feedback loops, their studies show 
that some policy makers are aware of feedback structures at least partially.  
 
3. Causal Maps of Policy Makers  
 
Previous studies of cognitive maps seem to be insufficient to analyze the feedback 
perception of policy makers. First, cognitive map analyses usually focus on specific 
events and thus causal assertions of policy makers are collected from their speech 
concerning on those events in a rather short time period. Cognitive maps constructed 
from one or two speech cannot fully capture the feedback thought of policy makers 
because policy makers’ speech are commonly intended to advocate certain policy 
measures rather than explain system structures. Second, cognitive maps include every 
causal assertions of policy makers. And hence causal maps become too complicated to 
be analyzed properly (Eden 1994).  
 
To avoid these drawbacks of traditional approach of cognitive maps, I have focused 
on the ‘causal maps of policy makers (CMPM)’ rather than their ‘cognitive map’. A 
causal map of policy makers is different from their cognitive map in that the former 
deals with policy makers’ assertions in longer time period than the latter and the 
former includes only those variables that comprise feedback loops. By dealing with 
policy makers’ causal assertions dispersed in the long period, we can avoid event-
specific causal assertions and capture the overall feedback thought of policy makers. 
By focusing on the variables comprising feedback loops, we can simplify and clarify 
systems thinking of policy makers.  
 
As causal map of policy makers is different from the cognitive map, it differs also 
from the traditional causal map. The causal map of policy makers represents their 
personal mental models, while the traditional causal map is intended to capture 
objective structures of systems. One can analyze how much systems thinking policy 
makers exercise by studying their causal maps.  
 
At the end of 1997, Korea experienced a national financial crisis and the first change 
of political power. After taking over the government office, President Dae Jung Kim 
began to restructure Korean economic structure. Against the expected resistance to his 
reforming efforts, President Dae Jung Kim tried to persuade business men and the 
people by explaining causes of financial crisis and how to overcome it. In order to 
construct a causal map of President Dae Jung Kim, I have collected all kind of 
assertions spoken by him in 1998 year. His assertions collected and analyzed are 
around 1,000 page volume. 
 
4. Main Feedback Loops of President Dae Jung Kim 
 
The most prominent feature in the causal map of President Dae Jung Kim on Korean 
economy is that he has a lot of feedback loops. In following sections I would like to 
explain several important feedback loops and then present overall structure of his 
causal map.  
 
4-1. Political Mechanism Leading to Economic Crisis 
During past thirty years President Dae Jung Kim has insisted that democracy should 
be established. And he has been oppressed by military leaders who argued that 
democracy must be postponed in favor of economic growth. Even he has been near to 
death by assassination and has been sentenced to death by militrary court. Thus it is 
not surprising that he attributes the cause of economic crisis to the lack of democracy.  
 
Lacking the democracy in political arena, there comes the collusive ties between 
politics and business that result in government controlled financing that benefit 
specific firms who support military powers. In this process, the firms who can profit 
easily with the support of government controlled financing lost their competitiveness. 
And the firm who lost market competitiveness cannot but strengthen the collusive ties 
to the government to survive in the market. This positive feedback loop reinceforces 
corruptions while weakens industrial competitiveness in the long run. 
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Figure 1. A positive feedback loop for weakening industrial competitivenss 
 
4-2. On The Effects of Financial Crisis  
The financial crisis occured in 1997 drives Korea near to the moratorium that means 
national bankruptcy. Foreign exchange rates, especially exchange rate between US 
dollar and Korean currency, began to increase abruptly and thus the interest rates for 
business loan. As a natural consequence, lots of firms has banckrupted and 
unemployment rate began to rise. In these unstable situations, it is very difficult for a 
policy maker to observe the effects of economic crisis. Figure 2 shows how President 
Dae Jung Kim diagnosed the crisis.  
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Figure 2. Feedback loops for the effects of financial crisis 
 
There are two feedback loops in figure 2. In these loops, it is commonly recognized 
that the foreign exchange crisis is caused by the decrease in foreign currency reserves 
and the foreign exchange crisis will increase interest rate of loans. The outer feedback 
loop says that the degree of financial crisis will be decreased by itself through 
increasing the interest rate that will reduce the amount of importation and thus 
increase the foreign currency reserves. 
 
A feedback loop located inside needs an explanation. A dotted arrow in this loop is a 
point, where IMF (Internaitonal Monetary Fund) officials and Dae Jung Kim insisted 
opposite polarity. Dae Jung Kim thought that high interest rate is harmful to the 
industrial competitiveness, while IMF officials regarded the high interest rate as 
increasing the competitiveness by way of exterminating the less competitive firms.  
 The interest rate policy was the most hot issue debated in 1998. This difference 
between them leads to the different perception of the polarity of the small feedback 
loop. Dae Jung Kim regarded it as positive loop that will aggravate the financial 
crisis. From the perspective of Dae Jung Kim, the high interest rate is detrimental to 
the Korean economy. That is why Dae Jung Kim tried to decrease the interest rate 
against the will of IMF and against his own perception of negative feedback loop 
effect of financial crisis and the interest rate.  
 
4-3. Strategic Reform for Overcoming the Crisis 
At the end of 1997 when Dae Jung Kim was elected as new President of Korea, most 
people perceived risky economic states and felt dangerous. In this situation, President 
Dae Jung Kim declared that he can overcome the national economic crisis within two 
years. No one if any believed his promise but have no choice but to follow his 
leadership. And after one and six months of his leadership, they were surprised to find 
lots of symptoms signalling economic recovery. 
 
Dae Jung Kim poured his entire time and efforts into reforming financial institutions 
and business structures. It is a rule that reform will bring about resistance from 
conservative parties. Figure 3 shows how did he overcome the resistance and thus the 

























Figure 3. Strategic use of feedback loops 
 
First of all, he noted that the financial crisis increases the perceived necessity of 
reform that will oppress the resiatance. The thick arrow in figure 3 represents this 
notion on causal relationship between the crisis and reform. As soon as he assumed 
the presidency, he stressed that the financial crisis is just like a national war occured 
fifty years ago. And he can strongly drive the reform policy in 1998.  
 
In addition to the reform policy, he introduced a new variable that will alleviate the 
financial crisis; the foreign investment. Korean economy had been famous for low 
level of foreign investment. Dae Jung Kim argued that we can overcome the financial 
crisis only with rapid increase in foreign investment. With the introduction of foreign 
investment two additional feedback loops were created; positive and negative loops. 
The reform brought about by the financial crisis will increase the credit rate and thus 
the foreign investement. The foreign investments will increase the foreign currency 
reserves and thus lowers the financial crisis. This is a negative feedback loop that 
controls the financial crisis.  
 
The introduction of foreign investment also creates a small positive feedback loop 
shown in figure 3. The foreign investment requires the higher level of transparent 
financial management that will necessarily change the traditional custom of business 
and financial institution of Korea. Within this positive feedback loop a business 
reform results in more revolutionary reforms required by foreign investment agencies. 
This positive feedbak loop accelerates the reform of business and financial institution. 
With the introduction of strategic policy variable, the resistance against reform has 
been counter-resisted by the positive feedback loop.  
 
4-4. A Crisis in Overcoming Crisis 
Although Dae Jung Kim was very clever in overcoming the financial crisis of Korea, 
there was also a crisis in his crisis management that came from the discontented 
people with the high rate of unemployment. Figure 4 shows how critical the 













Figure 4. A crisis from the high rate of unemployment 
 
The most weak point in his policy in exploiting the foreign investment is that it is 
highly sensitive to the discontent level of people and especially to the labor struggle. 
The Korean labor struggle is notorious for its strong activity that has been formed 
during the past military power regimes. Although labor forces were friendly to Dae 
Jung Kim in the past, they opposed to his reform policy as the unemployment rate 
goes high. The labor struggle was detrimental to his crisis management policy, 
because it will decrease the foreign investment.  
 
Furthermore the labor struggle and decrease of foreign investment forms a positive 
feedback loop as shown in figure 4. How did he deal with this positive feedback 
threat? One of the most effective policy leverage in the positive feedback lies in the 
critical mass. Once the key variable in the positive feedback loop goes down below 
the critical mass, the effect of positive feedback loop will shrink. To control the 
positive feedback loop of figure 4, one must reduce the level of discontent and labor 
struggle while increase the level of foreign investment below and above respective 
critical mass.  
 
However, what makes the matters worse is that the effect of foreign investment will 
take long time delay. To complement the time delay, one must reduce the level of 
discontent and labor struggle at least for the same time period of delay. To do this, 
Dae Jung Kim organized the tripartite commission among labor force, employers and 
government. As soon as he was elected as the President, he started its organizing. And 
even before his inauguration day, the tripartite commission reached an agreement on 
important measures toward business reform. With this agreement he could control the 
stength of labor struggle under the critical mass.  
 
5. Systems Thinking of the President Dae Jung Kim  
 
The causal map of Dae Jung Kim shows that he has lots of feedback loops. He seems 
to account well for those loops. Even he has used those loops strategically in 
enforcing his reform program. Korean economy showed many symptoms of recovery 
at 18 months after the financial crisis, much earlier than he has promised. On 
observing those symptoms he expressed pride but his reaction was very cautious. He 
stressed that Korean economy is far from recovery and thus must continue the 
reforming efforts. His careful reaction was exceptional in that most politicians are 
likely to over state his performance to increase popularity. His careful reaction seems 
to be highly strategic, which comes from recognizing the negative feedback loop 
discussed in figure 3. The abundance of feedback loops he accounted is impressive. 
Figure 5 shows the overall feedback structure of causal statements spoken by Dae 
Jung Kim in 1998.  
 
One can compare his causal map with that of past Deputy Prime Minister Kyung-Sik 
Kang shown in figure 6. In the early of 1999, Congress held a series of hearings to 
investigate the causes of financial crisis. Past Prime Minister who have failed in 
preventing the financial crisis was presented in the hearings and expressed his 
thought. The cognitive map of past Prime Minister is built from those hearings and 
complemented from his several speeches addressed during his occupation in the Prime 
Minister in 1997.  
 
One can find that the cognitive map of past Prime Minister has almost no feedback 
loop. He showed the misperception of feedback loops as the subject in experiments. 
Considering the fact that he has been more educated in economic theory than 
President Dae Jung Kim, the lack of feedback loops is curious phenomena enough. 
One can suppose some reasons for his misperception of feedback loops. First of all, 
one can conjecture that causal statements he expressed in the hearings was intended to 
defend himself and so he could not express every causal statements that might 
comprise feedback loops. However one cannot accept this explanation because there 
are lots of feedback loops that can be used for his defense. Some positive feedback 
loops that aggrevates the financial crisis can be refered to for proving its 
uncontrollable nature and thus his exemption from the responsibility. But he did not 















































































































































Figure 6. Cognitive map of past Deputy Prime Minister of Korea in 1997 and 1999 
One can also guess that the feedback misperception might arise from the narrow 
jurisdiction of Prime Minister. Because Prime Minister has short range of jurisdiction 
than the President, the cognitive map of the former lacks feedback loops presented in 
that of the latter. This conjecture also cannot be accepted. Before the financial crisis, 
Prime Minister had complete jurisdiction over the economic policies in Korea. After 
the financial crisis, President Dae Jung Kim abolished the position of Prime Minister 
and take the role of Prime Minister himself. This means that they have same 
jurisdiction at least over the economic policies. 
 
This contrasting difference between misperception and abundance of feedback loops 
can be attributed to the personal ability in systems thinking. Also one can consider 
another possibility. This difference might come from different backgrounds of both 
policy makers. The past Prime Minister is an economist, and most economists pay 
little attention to the feedback loops. On the other hand, President Dae Jung Kim 
suffered severe oppression during 30 years, and his suffering might nurture his 
strategic feedback thinking.  
 
Systems thinking of President Dae Jung Kim can be found not only in the abundance 
of feedback loops but also from his internal attribution of causes of financial crisis. He 
declared that the causes of financial crisis is internal rather than external. And he 
argued if we correct the internal causes of financial crisis, we can overcome it. In the 
following excerption, he argues that the crisis is a man-made disaster. And it is clear 
that the man here indicates past leaders of Korea not foreigners.  
 
“Legacies of the past continue to block our efforts. Those who grabbed power in 
the past had collusive links with business, controlled financing and indulged in 
corruption and injustice. As a result, all segments of society suffered while 
international competitiveness deteriorated. In this respect, the foreign exchange 
crisis was definitely a man-made disaster. We must determine its cause and learn 
a lesson for the future (from the speech of the President Dae Jung Kim).” 
 
6. Propositions for Discussions  
 
The causal map analysis of President Dae Jung Kim showed that policy makers can 
exploit systems thinking effectively. It follows naturally that one should not give up 
efforts toward learning and training systems thinking for policy makers. Previous 
findings for general tendency of feedback misperception must be interpreted as 
indicating the necessity of learning systems thinking not as cynicalism against its 
education.  
 
While analyzing the statements of President Dae Jung Kim that are longer than 1,000 
pages, I have encountered many interesting phenomena. Although those phenomena 
cannot be explained logically nor generalized until now, I believe, listing them will 
help future discussions on the causal map analysis of policy makers. 
 
Proposition 1: Policy makers tend to pay much attention on the positive feedback 
loops. This tendency can be observed from the causal map of President Dae Jung 
Kim. His policy direction has been determined by the positive feedback loops rather 
than negative ones as discussed in section 4. 
 
Proposition 2: Policy makers tend to ignore the negative feedback loops. Policy 
makers tend to regard the negative feedback loop as natural mechanism, while 
consider the positive one as artificial device. Even President Dae Jung Kim seemed to 
ignore the negative loop effects of economic recovery in the end of 1998 when he 
expressed pride in his performance.  
 
Proposition 3: Policy makers tend to use open loop thinking in devising policy 
measures. Policy makers seem to use stimuli-response paradigm in devising policy 
measures to solve policy problems. President Dae Jung Kim referred a lot of policy 
measures for overcoming the cirisis, but only a portion of them is related to the 
feedback loop. Especially most policy measures for lessening unemployment problem 
are introduced without considering the feedback loops.  
 
Above propositions are controversial. And I believe that we can get a lot of insight 
from discussing above propositions. Are there fundamental asymmetry between 
positive and negative feedback loops? Firms may be get into the troubles because they 
pay asymmetric attention to the positive feedback loops and ignore the negative ones. 
On the contrary, we may conjecture that asymmetric attention to the positive feedback 
loops might be justified in that positive a feedback loop brings about more serious 
problems than the negative one does.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
In this paper I suggested that the causal map of policy makers (CMPM) might be used 
as an effective method for investigating mental maps of policy makers and for 
understanding reasons determining policy directions. System scientists have pointed 
out that the causal map alone can enhance our understanding of complex social 
systems (Coyle 1998, Hall 1994, Eden 1988). In the same manner, we can say that the 
causal map of policy makers give much insights into the nature of policy makers.  
 
In this paper I also argued that the feedback misperception tendency must not be 
misperceived. As long as we believe that policy makers in public or private area are 
‘not idiots nor genius (NING)’, our research must go beyond previous findings of 
feedback misperpection. Our next questions will include following ones. Why policy 
makers differ in their perception of feedback loops? Why a policy maker shows 
different attitude to different feedback loops? From the abundance of feedback loops 
in the cognitive map of policy makers, can we assume their proper use of them? By 
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